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THE AMERICAN MODEL PENAL CODE: 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
Paul H. Robinson* and Markus D. Dubber** 
If there can be said to be an ':A.merican criminal code, "the Model Penal Code 
is it. Nonetheless, there remains an enormous diversity among the fifty-two 
American penal codes, including some that have never adopted a modern code 
format or structure. Yet, even within the minority of states without a modern 
code, the Model Penal Code has great influence, as courts regularly rely upon 
it to fashion the law that the state's criminal code fails to provide. In this essay 
we provide a brief introduction to this historic document, its origins, and its 
content. 
INTRODUCTION 
Within the United States, there are fifty-two American criminal codes, 
with the federal criminal code overlaying the codes of each of the fifty 
states and the District of Columbia. Under the U.S. Constitution, the 
power to impose criminal liability is reserved primarily to the states, with 
federal authority limited to the prohibition and punishment of offenses 
specially related to federal interests (including crimes committed on prop­
erty of exclusive federal jurisdiction such as military bases, crimes against 
certain federal officers, and crimes that involve conduct in more than one 
state that is difficult for a single state to effectively prosecute, such as drug 
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and organized crime offenses).1 The vast bulk of crimes and essentially all 
"street" crimes-homicide, rape, robbery, assault, and theft-fall under 
jurisdiction of one of the fifty state criminal codes or the code of the District 
of Columbia. 
There is much diversity among the fifty-two American criminal codes 
and, therefore, it is often difficult to state "the" American rule on any point 
of criminal law. But there also are many similarities among the codes, in 
large part due to the influence of the American Law Institute's Model Penal 
Code. Promulgated in 1962, the code prompted a wave of state code 
reforms in the 196os and 1970s, each influenced by the Model Penal Code. 
Some of the Model Penal Code provisions have not been widely accepted. 
For example, while the Model Penal Code generally rejects the common law's 
"felony murder" rule, which in its broadest form holds all killings in the 
course of a felony to be murder, most states have retained the rule. 
Similarly, a majority of states have rejected the Model Penal Code's inno­
vation in prescribing the same punishment for inchoate offenses, such as 
attempt, and consummated offenses. 
Nonetheless, the Model Penal Code is the closest thing to being an 
American criminal code. The federal criminal code is too unsystematic 
and incomplete in theory and too irrelevant in practice to function as a 
national code. Where states have not followed the Model Penal Code, 
the divergences locate points of controversy that often continue today. 
And the code and its commentaries have been the intellectual focus of 
much American criminal law scholarship since the code's promulgation.2 
I. THE HISTORY OF THE MODEL PENAL CODE 
The Model Penal Code was not the first or the most ambitious, but far and 
away the most successful attempt to codifY American criminal law. To 
appreciate the Model Penal Code's significance, it must be placed within the 
1. More specifically, the states' criminal law power derives from their "police power." 
The federal government has no police power and therefore must rest its criminal-law mak­
ing on other grounds, most notably the power to regulation interstate commerce. See 
Markus D. Dubber & Mark G. Kelman, American Criminal Law: Cases, Statutes, and 
Comments 2-3 (2005); see generally Markus D. Dubber, The Police Power: Patriarchy and 
the Foundations of American Government (2005). 
2. See generally Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Law: Model Penal Code §§ 1-2 (2002); 
Paul H. Robinson, Criminal Law § 2.1 (1997). 
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spotty history of American criminal codification.3 Unlike the development 
in continental Europe, modern criminal law in the United States did not 
arrive in the form of criminal codes. Rather than concern themselves with 
the threat of punishment, American reformers pragmatically proceeded 
directly to reform the punishment itself In the new field of corrections, 
Americans led the way. As a French resident of Philadelphia noted admir­
ingly in 1796, "the attempt at an almost entire abolition of the punishment 
of death, and the substitution of a system of reason and justice, to that of 
bonds, ill-treatment, and arbitrary punishment, was never made but in 
America."4 As early as 1776, Thomas Jefferson had drafted a bill for the 
Virginia legislature that called for punishment based on the theory of pre­
vention outlined by Cesare Beccaria and developed by Jeremy Bentham.5 
The final two decades of the eighteenth century brought the establishment 
of solitary confinement prisons in Philadelphia and then in New York and 
other states, including Virginia. 1823 saw the opening of the prison in 
Auburn, New York, to which visitors flocked from around the world, 
including Alexis de Tocqueville.6 
American criminal codes were first compiled by Edward Livingston 
and later David Dudley Field. Livingston's elaborate drafts for a federal 
criminal code and a Louisiana criminal code, completed in 1826, were both 
the most ambitious and the least successful efforts at criminal law codifica­
tion in the United States. Livingston's penal code was Benthamite both in 
scope and in substance. The penal code was divided into four separate 
codes comprising all aspects of penal law, from the definition of penal 
norms in a "Code of Crimes and Punishments," to the imposition of those 
norms in a "Code of Procedure" and a "Code of Evidence," and eventually 
3· For a more derailed treatment of the history of Anglo-American criminal codifica­
tion, see Sanford H. Kadish, Codifiers of the Criminal Law, in Blame and Punishment: 
Essays in the Criminal Law 205 (1987). 
4· Fran<;:ois-Alexandre-Frederic La Rochefoucauld-Liancourt, On the Prisons in 
Philadelphia 33 (1796) (quoted in Louis P. Masur, Rites of Execution: Capital Punishment 
and the Transformation of American Culture, 1776-1865, at 71 (1989)). 
5· For a critical appraisal of]efferson's draft, see Markus D. Dubber, "An Extraordinarily 
Beautiful Document": Jefferson's Bill for Proportioning Crimes and Punishments and the 
Challenge of Republican Punishment, in Modern Histories of Crime and Punishment 
(Markus D. Dubber & Lindsay Farmer eds., 2007). 
6. See Gustave de Beaumont & Alexis de Tocqueville, On the Penitentiary System in 
the United States and Its Application in France (1833). 
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to the actual infliction of sanctions in a "Code of Reform and Prison 
Discipline."7 Each aspect of the penal law, and each corresponding code, 
was individually, and as a system, designed to rationalize penal law on the 
utilitarian principle that Bentham had derived from Cesare Beccaria's 
famous treatise On Crimes and Punishments: Ia massima felicita divisa nel 
maggior numero. 8 
David Dudley Field was both far less ambitious, and far more success­
ful, as a criminal codifier. A successful New York lawyer, Field's codification 
efforts extended beyond the penal law and reflected pragmatic concerns 
about the accessibility of law, most importantly to lawyers.9 Field's codes 
were designed to simplify legal practice by sparing attorneys the tedium of 
having to sift through an ever rising mountain of common law opinions. 
As a result, Field was more concerned with streamlining than he was with 
systematizing or even reforming New York penal law. Field's New York 
Penal Code was submitted to the legislature in 1865, and passed into law in 
1881.1 0 It remained in force until it was replaced by the New York Penal Law 
of 1967. 
That New York Penal Law, like the revised criminal codes of many 
other states, was based in large part on the American Law Institute's 
Model Penal Code, which had been published in 1962. In fact, Herbert 
Wechsler, the Chief Reporter of the Model Penal Code, served on the 
legislative commission that drafted the New York code. 11 
The Model Penal Code combined Livingston's systematic ambition 
and integrated utilitarian approach with Field's pragmatism and legislative 
success. When the Model Penal Code project was launched in 1951, the 
vast majority of American criminal codes were in a sorry state. Only 
Louisiana had undertaken a serious effort to reform its criminal code since 
7. See Edward Livingston, The Complete Works of Edward Livingston on Criminal 
Jurisprudence (1873). 
8. Cesare Beccaria, Dei delitti e delle pene (1764). On the relation between Bentham 
and Beccaria, see H.L.A. Hart, Bentham and Beccaria, in Essays on Bentham: Studies in 
Jurisprudence and Political Theory 40 (1982). 
9· New York Field Codes (185o-1865). 
ro. 4 New York Field Codes (185o-1865). 
n. See generally Richard Banlett, Criminal Law Revision Through a Legislative 
Commission, 18 Buff L. Rev. 213 (1968-1969); Richard Denzer, Drafting a New Penal Law 
for New York, 18 Buff L. Rev. 251 (1968-1969). 
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the nineteenth century.1 2 A typical American criminal code at the time was 
less a code and more a collection of ad hoc statutory enactments, each 
enactment triggered by a crime or a crime problem that gained public 
interest for a time. What passed for a major "reform" in that period was 
the federal criminal code in 1948 putting the offenses in alphabetical order. 
Faced with this state of affairs, the American Law Institute's decision to 
draft a Model Penal Code was an ambitious undertaking. 
The American Law Institute (ALI) is a nongovernmental organization 
of highly regarded judges, lawyers, and law professors in the United States. 
The institute typically drafts a "restatement" of an area of law, which artic­
ulates and rationalizes the governing rules in American jurisdictions. 
When published, the ALI "Restatement of the Law" for a particular area 
often becomes persuasive authority for courts and legislatures and com­
monly is relied upon by courts in interpreting and applying the law. 
When the institute undertook its work on criminal law, however, it 
judged the existing law too chaotic and irrational to merit "restatement." 
What was needed, the institute concluded, was a model code, which states 
might use to draft new criminal codes. 
The institute's criminal law work was started in 1931, a year after the insti­
tute completed a model code of criminal procedure. But the work was stalled 
during the depression years by lack of adequate funding and later by the 
events surrounding World War II. It was renewed in 1951 with a grant from 
a private foundation and proceeded at full speed for more than a decade. 
From the beginning, the project bore the imprint of the Chief 
Reporter, Herbert Wechsler, a law professor at Columbia University who 
also had participated in the Nuremberg trials of Nazi war criminals.1 3 
Wechsler assembled a distinguished and remarkably diverse advisory 
committee of law professors, judges, lawyers, and prison officials, as well 
as experts from the fields of psychiatry, criminology, and even English 
literature.1 4 In addition, a number of drafting groups tackled various 
12. See La. Crim. Code (1942). 
13. On Wechsler's approach to criminal law codification, see Herbert Wechsler, The 
Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 Harv. L. Rev. 1097 (1952). 
14. Jerome Hall, the leading American criminal law theorist of the time, did not mean­
ingfully participate in the drafting of the code. C£ Jerome Hall, The Proposal to Prepare 
a Model Penal Code, 4 J. Legal Stud. 91 (1951); see also Markus D. Dubber, Penal 
Panopticon: The Idea of a Modern Model Penal Code, 4 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 53, 63-64 
(2000) (discussing Wechsler's rejection of Hall's retributivism). 
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specific topics, such as the treatment of insane offenders or the death 
penalty. After much debate within the drafting group and the advisory 
committee, tentative drafts of parts of the code with detailed commentary 
were presented to and debated by the entire membership of the institute 
at its annual meetings. This process of annually considering tentative 
drafts continued until 1962, when the institute finally approved a com­
plete Proposed Official Draft. The original drafters' commentaries con­
tained in the various tentative drafts were consolidated, revised, and finally 
republished along with the 1962 text as a six-volume set in 1985. 1 5  
The diversity of its advisory committee indicates the almost 
Livingstonian scope of the Model Penal Code's ambition. The Model 
Penal Code is not merely a criminal code, but rather extends to the law 
governing the infliction of punishment. In fact, the code refers to itself as 
a "Penal and Correctional Code" or P.C.C. , with its first two parts dedi­
cated to substantive criminal law and the other two parts addressing 
"treatment and correction" and "organization of correction," respectively.1 6 
No part of the Model Penal Code is explicitly devoted to the remaining 
aspect of penal law, the law of criminal procedure and evidence. 
Nonetheless, the code is littered with procedural provisions, including 
sections that determine the method and propriety of prosecution in par­
ticular cases;17 address the defendant's competency to stand trial;18 define, 
assign, and shift the burden of proof;1 9 establish evidentiary presumptions;20 
and deal with the appointment of expert witnesses. 21 These provisions com­
plement the ALI's 1930 Model Code of Criminal Procedure. Ten years 
after the completion of the Model Penal Code, the ALI also published a 
Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure. 
While the Model Penal Code acknowledged the importance of retri­
butional concerns, it commonly gave prominence to more utilitarian 
15. Model Penal Code (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). 
16. Id. § 1.01(1). 
17. Id. §§ !.07-.II, 2.12. 
18. Id. § 4.04. 
19. Id. §§ 1.12, 2.04(4), 2.08(4), 2.09(1), 2.10, 3-01-.II, 212.4(1), 212-5, 213.6, 22!.2(3), 
223.1(1), 223.4, 223.9, 230.3, 242.5. 
20. Id. §§ !.03(4), !.12(5), 5-03(7), 5.06(2) & (3), 5-07, 210.2(b), 2Il.2, 212.4, 223.6(2), 
223-7(1), 223.8, 224-5· 25!.2(4), 251.4· 
2r. Id. § 4.05. 
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functions: to deter criminal conduct and, in the event this failed, to 
diagnose the correctional and incapacitative needs of each offender. 22 
The Model Penal Code in this way laid the foundation for the 
Correctional Code. 23 For example, the Model Penal Code prescribes the 
same peno-correctional treatment for a person who attempts to commit 
an offense as for a person who manages to consummate the offense, 
because both undeterred offenders have displayed the same symptom of 
dangerousness. 24 
Still, it cannot be said that the Model Penal Code systematically worked 
out the implications of any particular theory of punishment (or treat­
ment). Adopting an approach that has been characterized as "principled 
pragmatism,"2 5 the code drafters never lost sight of the code's ultimate 
goal, the reform of American criminal law. Instead of rewriting criminal 
law in strict consequentialist terms, the code drafters took care to ground 
the code firmly in existing law and frequently sacrificed theoretical con­
sistency for pragmatic expediency. To continue with the example of attempt, 
the Model Penal Code carved out an exception for serious offenses, to blunt 
the otherwise radical impact of its new principle of equal treatment for 
attempted and consummated offenses.2 6  Similarly, the code did not con­
demn capital punishment, the one sanction that could not fit into its law 
of "treatment and correction." Instead, it addressed the question in a 
bracketed section that imposes many serious restrictions on the imposi­
tion of capital punishment.27 Ironically, this conflicted provision later 
became the foundation for several death penalty statutes and, eventually, 
the United States Supreme Court's effort to place capital punishment on 
a constitutional foundation. 28 
22. The purposes of the code's various parts are defined in id. § 1.02(1) & (2). See gen­
erally Dubber, supra note 14; Robinson, supra note 2, § 1.2. 
23. Model Penal Code pts. III & IV (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
24. Model Penal Code § 2.05 cmt. at 293-95 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1985). 
25. Herbert L. Packer, The Model Penal Code and Beyond, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 594 
(1963). 
26. Model Penal Code § 5.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
27. Id. § 210.6. 
28. See, e.g., McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 202 (1971); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 
U.S. 153, 158, 190-91, 194 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 247 (1976); California v. 
Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 1009 (1983). 
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II. THE INFLUENCE OF THE MODEL PENAL CODE 
As a pragmatic document, the Model Penal Code enjoyed great success in 
American legislatures. The code's impact on American criminal law far 
exceeded that of even the most successful earlier codification project, the 
Field code. But it was the criminal law portion of the code-the statement 
of general principles of liability in part I and the definition of specific 
offenses in part 11-that gained historic significance. The sentencing, 
treatment, and corrections portions, in parts III and IV, saw little accept­
ance and were soon left behind as American punishment theory and prac­
tice moved on to other approaches. 
Even before the Model Penal Code was finished, its tentative drafts 
were used as models for criminal code reform. The two decades following 
the 1962 promulgation saw a host of state recodifications. New codes were 
enacted in Illinois, effective in 1962; Minnesota and New Mexico in 1963; 
New York in 1967; Georgia in 1969; Kansas in 1970; Connecticut in 1971; 
Colorado and Oregon in 1972; Delaware, Hawaii, New Hampshire, 
Pennsylvania, and Utah in 1973; Montana, Ohio, and Texas in 1974; 
Florida, Kentucky, North Dakota, and Virginia in 1975; Arkansas, Maine, 
and Washington in 1976; South Dakota and Indiana in 1977; Arizona and 
Iowa in 1978; Missouri, Nebraska, and New Jersey in 1979; Alabama and 
Alaska in 1980; and Wyoming in 1983. All of these thirty-four enactments 
were influenced in some part by the Model Penal Code. Draft criminal 
codes produced in other states, such as California, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia, did 
not pass legislative review and may yet be revived. 
Of the states that have not yet adopted a modern criminal code, the 
federal system is the most unfortunate example. The U.S. Congress has 
tried on and off to reform the federal criminal code since 1966, when 
Congress established a code revision commission at the urging of 
President Johnson. 29 In 1971, the Brown Commission produced a compre­
hensive and systematic Proposed New Federal Criminal Code.30 Later 
code proposals, built upon the Brown Commission model, were intro­
duced as legislative bills. One of these bills even passed the Senate but died 
29. See generally Ronald L. Gainer, Federal Criminal Code Reform: Past and Future, 
2 Buff Crim. L. Rev. 45 (1998). 
30. National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Repon: A 
Proposed New Federal Criminal Code (1971). 
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in the House of Representatives. Criminal code reform is always difficult 
because it touches highly political issues, but the lack of a modern federal 
criminal code is considered a matter of some embarrassment among crim­
inal law scholars in the United States. The present federal criminal code is 
not significantly different in form from the alphabetical listing of offenses 
that was typical of American codes in the r8oos. 
The Model Penal Code's influence has not been confined to the reform 
of state codes. Thousands of court opinions have cited the Model Penal 
Code as persuasive authority for the interpretation of an existing statute 
or in the exercise of a court's occasional power to formulate a criminal law 
doctrine. (As is well known, while American courts have authority to 
interpret a code's ambiguous provisions, they generally are bound to fol­
low what they know to be the legislative intention, and bound by inter­
pretation decisions of a higher court.) 
Even the Model Penal Code's official commentaries have been influential. 
Many states have little legislative history available for their courts to use in 
interpreting a state code provision. Where the state code provision was 
derived from or influenced by a Model Penal Code provision, the Model 
Penal Code's commentary often is the best available authority on the rea­
soning behind the provision and its intended effect. 
The code's official commentaries also have become an important 
research source for criminal law scholars. The commentaries generally give 
a thoughtful and detailed explanation of the reasoning underlying a code 
provision as well as the scholarly debates concerning it. Also, because the 
official commentaries were not published until 1980 (Special Part) and 
1985 (General Part), the commentary drafters had available to them infor­
mation on how each of the Model Penal Code provisions fared during the 
previous two decades of state criminal code reform. The extent of a code 
provision's reception or rejection by the states often is detailed in the offi­
cial commentaries. 
The code's provisions for sentencing31 and treatment32 have not been 
influential.33 They reflect a rehabilitative approach that has since passed out 
31. Model Penal Code arts. 6 & 7 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
32. Id. pts. III & IV. 
33· The American Law Institute is currently considering a revision of the code's sen­
tencing provisions. See Symposium, Model Penal Code: Sentencing, 7 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 
1-306 (2003); see also Kevin R. Rein, American Law Institute, Model Penal Code: 
Sentencing, Plan for Revision, 6 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 525 (2003). 
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of favor. The code has many fewer grading categories than most modern 
American codes, thereby allowing greater sentencing discretion within each 
offense grade.34 Its sentencing system generally relies upon the exercise of 
broad discretion by judges to individualize an offender's sentence. 
In contrast, current American practice is to limit sentencing discre­
tion.3 5 That change in approach comes in part from a belief that discretion 
undercuts the virtues of the legality principle: Discretion increases the 
likelihood of disparate sentences for similar offenders committing similar 
offenses.36 Discretion increases the potential for abuse by a biased decision 
maker. Discretion undercuts predictability, which is important for both 
effective deterrence and fair notice. Finally, discretion shifts the criminal­
ization and punishment decisions away from the legislative branch and to 
the less democratic judicial and executive branches of government. 
The code's discretionary sentencing system also is of little current influ­
ence in the U. S. because of a change in the underlying theory of liability and 
punishment. 37 The code's use of discretion was consistent with its interest in 
using the criminal justice system to promote rehabilitation and to incapaci­
tate dangerous offenders who could not be rehabilitated. With that purpose, 
the length of an offender's incarceration logically depended upon how the 
person changed during his criminal commitment. An actual release date 
could only be determined when an offender appeared to be ready for release. 
The limited ability of the social sciences to rehabilitate and to reliably 
predict future dangerousness has dampened the interest in broad sen­
tencing discretion. This, along with a growing interest in imposing just 
punishment, has led to less sentencing discretion and more determinate 
sentences (that is, sentences not subject to early release on parole). 
This change in the underlying penal philosophy affected the legislative 
success not only of the code's sentencing and treatment provisions but also 
34· See Gerard E. Lynch, Towards a Model Penal Code, Second (Federal?): The 
Challenge of the Special Pan, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 297 (1998). 
35· See, for example, the (once) mandatory sentencing guidelines for federal courts, 
United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual (2005). The future of determinate guideline 
sentencing in the United States, however, recently has been thrown into doubt. See United 
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005) (federal sentencing guidelines merely advisory). 
36. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order (1973). 
37· See, e.g., Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice: The Choice of Punishments (1976); 
Francis A Allen, The Decline of the Rehabilitative Ideal: Penal Policy and Social Purpose 
(1981); Herben Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 Monist 475 (1968). 
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of some of its liability and grading provisions. For example, few states have 
followed the code's abandonment of the common law distinction between 
the punishment for attempted and consummated offenses. The code's pol­
icy makes good sense if one's focus is on rehabilitation and incapacitation of 
the dangerous-an offender may be equally dangerous whether or not his 
conduct in fact causes the harm intended or risked. On the other hand, if 
the criminal law is to capture the community's sense of justice, then the com­
munity's shared intuition that resulting harm does matter cannot be ignored. 38 
The code's Special Part also has become dated in some areas, such as in 
its treatment of sexual offenses and drug offenses. American society's views 
on many sexual and gender issues have changed since the code was drafted 
in the 1950s. Modern American codes typically adopt a gender-neutral 
approach to defining sexual offenses, give greater expression to the con­
cern for victims of sexual offenses, and reflect a greater sensitivity to the 
history of sexual victimization of women by men. For instance, beginning 
in the 1980s, states began to reject the marital immunity for rape, which 
the Model Penal Code had retained from the common law. At the same 
time, drug offenses now figure among the most serious offenses defined in 
American criminal codes. In 1962 the Model Penal Code included no drug 
offenses. In an appendix to the code's Special Part, the drafters merely 
remarked that "a State enacting a new Penal Code may insert additional 
Articles dealing with special topics such as narcotics, alcoholic beverages, 
gambling and offenses against tax and trade laws. "39 
Ill. THE INNOVATIONS OF THE MODEL PENAL CODE 
To appreciate the Model Penal Code's contribution to criminal law codi­
fication in the United States, it is important to recall the embryonic state 
of the subject at the outset of the Model Penal Code project in the early 
1950s. The then most recent codification effort was that of the 1948 reform 
38. Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, Jusrice, Liability, and Blame: Community 
Views and the Criminal Law (1995); Paul H. Robinson, Competing Conceptions of 
Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological & Empirical (forthcoming 2007); Paul H. 
Robinson & John M. Darley, Intuitions of Justice: Implications for Criminal Law and 
Justice Policy (forthcoming 2007). 
39· Model Penal Code app. (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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of the federal criminal code, an alphabetical ordering of federal crimes for 
which, according to a contemporary observer, "the spadework was done 
by the hired hands of three commercial law-book publishers, on delega­
tion from a congressional committee desirous of escaping the responsibil­
ity of hiring and supervising its own staf£"40 
As a result, the Model Penal Code drafters had virtually no existing 
American criminal codes to which to turn, with the possible exception of 
the recently reformed criminal code of Louisiana. That code, however, 
could have only limited significance for a Model Penal Code of American 
criminal law because of the unique history and nature of Louisiana law, 
which alone among the states was rooted not in uncodified English com­
mon law, but in codified European civil law. Much of what the Model 
Penal Code introduced into the United States has long been common 
practice in European codes. But while the code's structure generally resem­
bles that of many European codes, the extent to which these foreign codes 
more directly influenced the Model Penal Code is unclear. The strongest 
foreign influence on the code came in the person of Glanville Williams, a 
British criminal law expert on the uncodified English common law. 
A. A Comprehensive General Part 
The Model Penal Code drafters created a "General Part" that contains a set 
of general principles applicable to each of the specific offenses contained in 
the "Special Part" of the code. The general principles include such matters 
as general principles for imposing liability, general principles of defense, 
general inchoate offenses, etc. Such a structure, hardly revolutianry by 
European standards, provides greater clarity and sophistication while 
simultaneously simplifYing the code. Instead of having to repeat the rules 
governing complicity, omission liability, culpability requirements, or avail­
able defenses, for example, in each offense (or leaving them to the courts to 
define), the rules can be stated once in detailed form in the General Part, 
to be referred to in the prosecution of any offense in the Special Part. 
The current federal criminal "code" is typical of what existed in the 
states before the Model Penal Code. It has essentially no General Part. 
(The term "code" may suggest a document of greater coherence and 
planning than is present in the current federal "code," so it may be better 
40. Henry M. Hart, Jr. The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs. 401, 
432 n.?O (1958). 
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to refer simply to "Title 18 of the United States Code"). Title 18's chapter 1, 
grandly tided "General Provisions, " includes a less-than-helpful definition 
of complicity, an insanity defense, and a few definitions. Thus, 99 percent 
of the General Part remains uncodified in federal law, thereby delegating 
criminal-law making authority to the federal judiciary. 
B. An Analytic Structure 
The Model Penal Code, like most successful criminal codes, implicitly 
provides an analytic structure that gives judges, lawyers, and jurors a deci­
sional process for assessing criminal liability.41 Its three-part structure 
might be summarized with these questions: 
First, does the actor's conduct constitute a crime? The code defines the 
contours of the law's prohibitions (and, where duties to act are created, the 
law's commands). This is the issue most familiar to laypersons and most 
prominent in older criminal codes. It is the sole subject of the code's entire 
Special Part. 
Second, even if the actor's conduct does constitute a crime, are there 
special reasons why that conduct ought not to be considered wrongful in 
this instance, under these facts? Article 3 of the Model Penal Code answers 
this question through the use of justification defenses. These defenses con­
cede the violation of a prohibitory norm, but offer a countervailing justi­
ficatory norm that undercuts the propriety of liability on the special facts 
of the current situation. 
Finally, even if the actor's conduct is a crime and is wrongful (unjusti­
fied), should the actor be held blameworthy for it? Is he or she deserving 
of criminal liability and punishment? This question is answered primarily 
by the excuse defenses and culpability requirements in articles 2 and 4 of 
the code. For example, wrongful conduct by an actor who is at the time 
insane or under duress or involuntarily intoxicated may not be sufficiently 
blameworthy to merit the condemnation of criminal conviction. 
C. Defining Offenses Fully, Using Defined Terms 
The Model Penal Code drafters understood that an undefined term invites 
judicial lawmaking in the same way as an absent or partial provision, and 
41. See Dubber, supra note 2, §§ 3, r8; Paul H. Robinson, Structure & Function in 
Criminal Law pt. II (1997). For a functional analysis of the code's structure, see id. pt. III. 
HeinOnline -- 10 New Crim. L. Rev. 332 2007
332 I NEW CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW I VOL. 10 I NO. 3 I SUMMER 2007 
can as effectively undercut the goals of the legality principle. Every code 
will inevitably contain ambiguous language that must be interpreted by 
judges. A drafter's obligation, they believed, is to reserve that delegation of 
judicial authority to the instances in which it is not reasonably avoidable. 
Code terms that might reasonably be given different definitions by differ­
ent readers ought to be defined. 
With this view, the Model Penal Code drafters did much to fully define 
offenses and to define the terms they used in defining offenses; the code 
explicitly rejects common law offenses and bars judicial creation of offenses. 42 
In addition, the code's General Part includes definitions of commonly used 
terms that will then have the same meaning in every provision of the code. 
Defined terms also are contained at the beginning of many articles in the 
Special Part. 
Compared to many European criminal codes, the Model Penal Code 
covers more topics in greater detail. As a result, the code occasionally 
reads more like a criminal law textbook than a code. Its comprehensive­
ness and detail reflect the scope and nature of the code's reform ambition. 
Topics can be left for judicial or scholarly interpretation only in the pres­
ence of a highly sophisticated judiciary and academic community. At the 
time of the code project, the criminal law in the United States met nei­
ther of these conditions. The code, after all, was specifically designed to 
wrest the criminal law out of the hands of the judiciary which, after cen­
turies of common-law making, had left the criminal law an unprincipled 
mess. 
D. A System for the Interpretation of Code Provisions 
The Model Penal Code drafters' concern for advancing legality interests 
also showed in their creation of a system for the interpretation of the 
code's provisions. Such guidance in the exercise of judicial discretion 
increases the law's predictability and reduces both disparity in application 
and the potential for abuse of discretion. 
The statutory principles of interpretation also are designed to advance 
the goals for which criminal liability and punishment are imposed. Model 
Penal Code section 1.02 directs judges to interpret ambiguous provisions 
42. Model Penal Code § 1.05 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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to further the code's purposes.43 While such a provision has its shortcom­
ings (it gives no guidance on what to do when different purposes conflict, 
as frequently occurs), it is an important first step toward rationality in 
code drafting, for it offers a formal statement of what the code is meant to 
achieve. 
E. A System of Offenses 
Rather than a collection of offenses, where each offense is an independent 
creature, often the result of a political campaign prompted by a particular 
crime or event, the Model Penal Code adopts a system of offenses, in which 
offenses are designed to work together as a complementary group. 
Offenses typically avoid both gaps and overlaps in coverage. By consider­
ing all offenses together, the legislature can better insure that the penalties 
associated with each offense properly reflect the relative seriousness of that 
offense in relation to other offenses. 
Part of this systematic approach to creating and defining offenses is to 
organize offenses conceptually-offenses against the person, offenses agai­
nst property, etc.-and within each general group to organize offenses into 
related subcategories.44 Offenses against the person, for example, are 
organized into four articles: homicide (§ 210); assault, endangerment, and 
threats (§ 211); kidnapping and related offenses (§ 212); and sexual offenses 
(§ 213). Such conceptual grouping makes it easier to see, and to avoid, 
overlaps among offenses and unwarranted grading disparities. It also 
makes it easier for a code user to find the relevant offense. And, when the 
relevant offense is found, such grouping insures the user that related 
offenses are nearby, not hidden in a dark corner elsewhere in the code. 
43· The code's purposes are: 
(a) to forbid and prevent conduct that unjustifiably and inexcusably inflicts or threatens sub­
stantial harm to individual or public interests; (b) to subject to public control persons whose 
conduct indicates that they are disposed to commit crimes; (c) to safeguard conduct that is 
without fault from condemnation as criminal; (d) to give fair warning of the nature of the con­
duct declared to constitute an offense; (e) to differentiate on reasonable grounds between seri­
ous and minor offenses. 
Model Penal Code§ r.o2(1)(a)-(e) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
44· For a comparative discussion of the code's notion of "individual or public inrerests" 
and the concept of Rechtsgut in German criminal law, see Markus D. Dubber, Theories of 
Crime and Punishmenr in German Criminal Law, 53 Am.]. Comp. L. 679 (20o6). 
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F. Innovations in Specific Criminal Law Doctrines 
In substance, the Model Penal Code is based on the American criminal 
law at the time it was drafted. For the vast majority of issues in the gen­
eral and special part of criminal law, this law was judge-made common 
law. If the code drafters ventured beyond the confines of American crim­
inal law, they consulted English common law jurisprudence, particularly 
as interpreted by Glanville Williams, whose extended project to rational­
ize English criminal law coincided with Herbert Wechsler's attempt to 
rationalize American criminal law through the Model Penal Code.4 5 
Many of the Model Penal Code's substantive innovations already were 
laid out in Wechsler's monumental 1937 article, "A Rationale of the Law 
of Homicide. "46 There Wechsler, and his Columbia colleague Jerome 
Michael, subjected American criminal law to a detailed critique, using the 
law of homicide as an illustration. The Model Penal Code thus arose from 
a painstaking critique of positive law, rather than from a systematic theory 
of criminal liability. Wechsler was no theoretician. As a major figure in the 
American legal process school, Wechsler saw the problems of substantive 
criminal law as problems of policy. The criminal law, and therefore the 
Model Penal Code, was a means to achieve a policy endY 
1. Offense Elements 
The Model Penal Code set out to simplifY and rationalize the hodgepodge 
of common law offense definitions in two ways.48 First, it adopted an 
approach that has been called "element analysis, " which carefully distin­
guished between the various elements of an offense, including conduct, 
attendant circumstances, and its result. Second, it recognized and defined 
only four mental states: purpose, knowledge, recklessness, and negligence. 
Each objective element of a given offense in the code can have attached to 
it a different mental state. 
45· See Glanville W illiams, Criminal Law: The General Pan (1st ed. 1953; 2d ed. 1962). 
46. Jerome Michael & Herbert Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide I & II, 
37 Colum. L. Rev. 701, 1261 (1937). 
47· That end, however, in Wechsler's opinion, recently had been scientifically sertled 
once and for all in favor of a deterrent-rehabilitative approach. See id. at 732 n.126. 
48. Paul H. Robinson & Jane A. Grall, Element Analysis in Defining Criminal 
Liability, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 681 (1983); Robinson, supra note 41, ch. 3· 
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The first innovation was designed to eliminate the common law's con­
fusion about the so-called mens rea of a given offense. This confusion, the 
code drafters believed, often resulted from the inability of the common 
law to distinguish between different elements of an offense, each of which 
may require a different mental state for conviction. 
Standing alone, the differentiation of various offense elements, coupled 
with the novel requirement that each element, rather than merely each 
offense, carry a mental state, might have complicated rather than simpli­
fied the law. The second innovation addressed this problem by replacing 
the dozens of mental states that had emerged over the course of the com­
mon law with merely four. 
This radical change in the law of mens rea, one of the core principles of 
the common law, drew little criticism from commentators and proved 
remarkably popular among state legislatures.49 In fact, the Model Penal 
Code's definitions of these four mental states may be the code's most 
important contribution to American criminal law reform. These definitions 
strove to simplifY not only by radically reducing the number of mental 
states, but also by reducing (but not eliminating) reliance upon normative 
judgments. Talk of "malice aforethought" and even "premeditation" were 
replaced by presumably testable phenomena such as "conscious object" or 
"knowledge." In its zeal to clarifY the law, the Model Penal Code even 
excised the words "intent" and "intention" from its terminology, concepts 
that in spite (or perhaps partly because) of their ambiguity had assumed a 
central place in the criminal law of the United States, as well as of many 
other countries. 50 
On the subject of so-called strict or absolute liability offenses, i.e., 
offenses whose elements do not all require a culpability state, the Model 
Penal Code struck a characteristically pragmatic compromise. Instead of 
eliminating such offenses altogether, it limited their common use to two 
offense categories, "civil offenses" defined in the criminal code as "viola­
tions," punishable only by fine, forfeiture, or other civil penalty, and 
"offenses defined by statutes other than the code, insofar as a legislative 
purpose to impose absolute liability for such offenses or with respect to 
49· But see Jerome Hall, Negligent Behavior Should Be Excluded from Penal Liability, 
63 Colum. L. Rev. 632 (1963). 
50. But c£ N.Y. Penal Law § 15.05(1) (2oo6) (retaining mental state of "intentional," 
but redefining it in terms of"conscious objective"). 
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any material element thereof plainly appears. "51 The Model Penal Code 
does not prohibit strict liability in the code's offenses, but does create a 
presumption against interpreting the absence of a culpability element as 
strict liability. Instead, a requirement of recklessness is read into an offense 
that contains no specific culpable state of mind requirement.52 
In the particular case of felony murder, a serious strict liability offense 
under the common law whose definition required no mental state with 
respect to the act of homicide, the Model Penal Code transformed the def­
initional question into an evidentiary one. Instead of eliminating the 
requirement of a mental state with respect to the homicidal act, as the 
common law had done, the code instead established a rebuttable pre­
sumption that the perpetrator of an underlying felony in fact had the 
mental state with respect to the killing that would constitute murder (reck­
lessness manifesting an extreme indifference to the value of human life). 53 
2. Inchoate and Accomplice Liability 
The Model Penal Code's abandonment of the common law distinction 
between inchoate and consummated offenses already has been men­
tioned.54 This decision was both the most doctrinaire and the least suc­
cessful by the code drafters. Punishing inchoate offenses as harshly as 
consummated ones appears particularly harsh against the background of 
the wide sweep of inchoate offenses under the code. By defining all 
inchoate offenses in its General Part, the code cemented the common 
law's broad approach to preparatory offenses. Every crime, including the 
pettiest misdemeanor, was criminalized in its inchoate form, whether as 
an attempt, a solicitation, or as a conspiracy. Still, the Model Penal Code 
did bar the conviction of, though not the prosecution for, both the 
inchoate and the consummated form of an offense.55 The code thereby 
rejected the most expansive theory of inchoate offenses under the com­
mon law, still espoused at the time by federal criminal law, which had 
permitted separate punishments for the preparation and consummation 
51. Model Penal Code § 2.05 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
52. Id. § 2.02(3). 
53· Id. § 210.2(1)(b). 
54· See generally Herbert Wechsler et a!., The Treatment of Inchoate Crimes in the 
Model Penal Code I & II, 61 Colum. L. Rev. 571, 957 (1961). 
55· Model Penal Code § 1.07(1)(b) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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of the same offense. 5 6  The code also prohibits multiple convictions "of 
more than one [inchoate] offense . . .  for conduct designed to commit or 
to culminate in the commission of the same crime. "5 7 
The Model Penal Code draws a sharp theoretical distinction between 
inchoate offenses and complicity, which was defined as the attribution of 
the principal's criminal conduct to another. 58 The distinction was of less 
practical significance, however, as the code abandoned not only the dis­
tinction between the punishment for preparatory and consummated 
offenses, but also that between the punishment of principals and acces­
sories. In fact, the code discarded the common law distinctions between 
first- and second-degree principals, on the one hand, and accessories before 
and after the fact, on the other, in favor of a single distinction between 
principal and accomplice, both of whom were then subjected to the same 
punishment. 5 9  
Only after an intervention by Judge Learned Hand, one of America's 
most prominent judges, did the American Law Institute reject the drafters' 
proposal to extend accomplice liability, and therefore full punishment as a 
principal, to a person who was merely aware of his contribution to the 
principal's criminal act. 60 The code instead requires that the accomplice act 
"with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the commission of the 
offense."61 As a compromise, some states have adopted general facilitation 
provisions that criminalize aiding another's criminal conduct knowingly 
or merely "believing it probable" that one is rendering aidY 
3. Justification Defenses 
The code for the first time recognized a general defense of necessity, or 
lesser evils. This defense is available where particular justification defenses, 
such as self-defense, defense of property, or law enforcement authority, 
56. See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961). 
57· Model Penal Code§ 5.05(3) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
58. See id. § 2.06. 
59· On the common law of complicity, see Francis Bowes Sayre, Criminal Responsibility 
for the Acts of Another, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 689 (1930). 
6o. Model Penal Code § 2.06 cmt. at 313-19 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 
1985). 
6r. Model Penal Code § 2.o6(3)(a) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
62. N.Y. Penal Law§ n5.00 (20o6). 
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are not. The defense applies to conduct the actor believes to be "necessary 
to avoid a harm or evil to himself or another," provided that "the harm or 
evil sought to be avoided by such conduct is greater than that sought to 
be prevented by the law defining the offense charged."63 The broad scope 
of this provision is best illustrated by the cases enumerated in the official 
code commentary: 
Under this section, property may be destroyed to prevent the spread of a 
fire. A speed limit may be violated in pursuing a suspected criminal. An 
ambulance may pass a traffic light. Mountain climbers lost in a storm may 
take refuge in a house or may appropriate provisions. Cargo may be jetti­
soned or an embargo violated to preserve the vessel. An alien may violate 
a curfew in order to reach an air raid shelter. A druggist may dispense a 
drug without the requisite prescription to alleviate grave distress in an 
emergency.64 
The lesser evils defense does not affect the actor's civil liability and is a so­
called affirmative defense. To successfully invoke an affirmative defense, 
the defendant must produce supporting evidence before the burden of 
proof shifts to the prosecution, which must then disprove the defense 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 6 5  The code frequently relies on this procedural 
mechanism to resolve difficult issues of substantive criminal law. 6 6  
4. Excuse Defenses 
The Model Penal Code drafters devoted almost an entire article to the 
problem of legal insanity. Except for its final section, which sets the age of 
maturity for purposes of criminal liability at sixteen,67 article 4 deals in 
great detail with the full panoply of substantive and procedural issues sur­
rounding the defense of insanity, including such procedural questions as 
the defendant's competency to stand trial, the assignment of the burden of 
proof, the requirement of notice that an insanity defense will be offered, 
the form of the verdict and judgment, the appointment and selection of 
63. Model Penal Code § 3.02(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
64. Model Penal Code§ 1.01 cmt. at 9-10 (Official Draft and Revised Comments 1985). 
65. Model Penal Code §§ 1.12, 3.01 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
66. See sections cited supra note 10. 
67. Model Penal Code § 4.10 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
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psychiatric experts, the admissibility of statements made during the exam­
ination, the form of the psychiatrist's report, the hearing on the question 
of insanity or competency, and the commitment following an acquittal on 
the basis of insanity. 
The Model Penal Code's extensive coverage of mental illness reflects the 
conflicts surrounding this issue during the decade of the code's drafting. 
The advisory committee included several members of the "Group for the 
Advancement of Psychiatry," whose members were determined to radically 
reform the criminal law in the name of the science of psychiatry. In 1954, 
three years into the code project, the federal appellate court for the 
District of Columbia, in the famous Durham case, 68 replaced the so-called 
right-wrong test of insanity derived from the 1843 English case of 
M'Naghten69 with a test designed to reflect advances in the field of psychi­
atry as well as to soften the perceived harshness of the M'Naghten rule. 
Characteristically, the Model Penal Code once again struck a compro­
mise by retaining but softening the M'Naghten test while assigning psy­
chiatric experts a central role in the test's interpretation and application. 
The M'Naghten rule in its original formulation required that, "at the time 
of the committing of the act, the party accused was laboring under such a 
defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as not to know the nature and 
quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he did not know 
he was doing what was wrong." The Model Penal Code extended the 
defense to an actor who "lacks substantial capacity . . .  to appreciate the 
criminality of his conduct. "70 In addition, the Model Penal Code made 
the defense available even to an actor who did not qualify under this 
cognitive prong, as long as he lacked "substantial" volitional capacity "to 
conform his conduct to the requirements of law. "71 
The Model Penal Code's insanity test proved popular in many 
American jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia after the aban­
donment of its Durham rule in 1972.72 Following John Hinckley's acquittal 
68. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954). The Durham test was 
deceptively simple: "an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the 
product of mental disease or mental defect." For later complications and the eventual 
demise of Durham, see United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (1972) (en bane) 
69. M'Naghten's Case, I C. & K. 130; 4 St. Tr. N.S. 847 (1843). 
70. Model Penal Code§ 4.0 1 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
7!. !d. § 4-01. 
72. United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en bane). 
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under the volitional prong of the Model Penal Code's test for his assassi­
nation attempt on President Reagan in 1981, however, many states and 
the federal government restricted the defense of insanity by removing the 
volitional prong.73 
5. Special Part 
Most of the Model Penal Code's specific doctrinal innovations appeared in 
its General Part. The most important innovation in the Special Part was 
its revision of the law of homicide. The code's homicide article provides 
the best illustration of its new system of mental states. 74 In this article, the 
code drafters replaced the common law's multitude of homicide offenses 
with a single offense-"purposely, knowingly, recklessly or negligently 
caus[ing] the death of another human being"-with three defined grades. 
Murder, manslaughter, and negligent homicide thus differed primarily in 
their mental state, the first requiring purpose or knowledge, the second 
recklessness, and the third negligence. 
The code's partial rejection of the felony murder rule already has been 
discussed. The common law defense of provocation was retained, though 
not without being transformed into the more general defense of "extreme 
mental or emotional disturbance." 75 The code made no attempt to con­
nect this defense to other more general excuse defenses in its General Part. 
It therefore survives as a defense available only in homicide cases. 
CONCLUSION 
For almost half a century, the Model Penal Code has been the dominant 
force in American criminal code reform and a catalyst for American crim­
inal law scholarship. In general, the Model Penal Code has stood the test 
of time. While individual provisions of the code, such as its definition of 
insanity and its grading of inchoate offenses, have been amended for one 
reason or another, no state has seen fit to undertake a wholesale reform 
of its criminal code away from the Model Penal Code. Even academic 
73· See, e.g., Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Cr. 2709 (2006). 
74· Model Penal Code an. 210 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
75· ld. § 2IO.J(r)(b). 
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commentary generally has come to focus on the code, albeit not always 
agreeing with it/6 
Nonetheless, the code is showing its age as the theory and practice of 
American criminal law has long since rejected the code's emphasis on 
deterrence and rehabilitation and as attitudes toward criminalization have 
shifted. A reform of the model therefore is much needed. When that 
reform comes, however, there can be little doubt that it will build upon 
the foundations laid down in the Model Penal Code. 
76. For collections of code commentary during its first twenty years, see Symposium, 
The Model Penal Code, 63 Colum. L. Rev. 589 (1963), and Symposium, The 25th 
Anniversary of the Model Penal Code, 19 Rutgers L.J. 519 (1988). For a more recent criti­
cal exchange regarding the Model Code, see George P. Fletcher, Dogmas of the Model 
Penal Code, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 3 (1998), and Paul H. Robinson, In Defense of the 
Model Penal Code: A Reply to Professor Fletcher, 2 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 25 (1998). 
